Telegram, with its focus on privacy and end-to-end encryption, has become one of the most popular platforms for secure communication. While it offers valuable tools for activists, journalists, and dissidents, it also provides fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. In recent years, closed Telegram channels have grown into potent and difficult-to-monitor sources of misleading narratives, propaganda, and fake news.
Disinformation campaigns have traditionally relied on public platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to reach broad audiences. However, the growing efforts of these platforms to moderate content have pushed bad actors into less visible corners of the internet. Telegram’s closed channels and private groups allow content to spread under the radar, with minimal oversight.
Unlike open groups, closed channels limit access to invited members only. This creates an echo chamber where narratives remain unchallenged. Members are often encouraged not to share external links or seek alternative viewpoints. As a result, these channels serve as self-reinforcing loops for conspiracy theories and misinformation.
In February 2025, several investigations across Europe revealed that disinformation campaigns tied to political actors were migrating en masse to Telegram. These campaigns are using the platform to spread polarising content, distort public opinion, and amplify social divisions with far less risk of removal or detection.
Telegram’s architecture is designed around user privacy. Its servers store minimal metadata, messages in secret chats are end-to-end encrypted, and users can hide their phone numbers. These features are beneficial for personal security but also empower disinformation groups to organise undetected.
One of the most attractive features for such groups is Telegram’s broadcasting capability via channels. Admins can post content to thousands of subscribers without allowing replies or visible dissent. This one-way flow of information is ideal for manipulation, as it prevents organic discourse.
Furthermore, content on Telegram can be deleted or edited at any time without leaving a visible trace. This makes it difficult for researchers or fact-checkers to preserve evidence of disinformation or track its evolution over time.
The rise of Telegram as a disinformation hotspot is not merely a theoretical concern. It has tangible effects on political processes, public health, and security. In several Eastern European countries, for instance, fake news about elections and vaccine safety spread primarily through Telegram in 2024, influencing voter behaviour and vaccination rates.
Closed Telegram channels often masquerade as grassroots news sources or whistleblower collectives. They exploit distrust in mainstream media and capitalise on the ambiguity between verified and unverifiable content. Once a user subscribes, they are exposed to a steady stream of selective facts, altered images, and manipulated videos.
Authorities face challenges in investigating these channels due to the legal grey areas surrounding encryption and privacy rights. As a result, many of the masterminds behind large-scale disinformation remain anonymous and operational, continuing to reach thousands daily with little resistance.
In Germany, a prominent Telegram channel falsely claimed that ballots had been destroyed during the state elections, triggering mass protests. The story was debunked within hours, but the damage had already been done. Tens of thousands had viewed the content, shared it in private groups, and organised demonstrations.
Meanwhile, in Slovakia, a health-related disinformation campaign ran rampant through several closed Telegram channels. It alleged that a new wave of COVID-19 vaccines contained microchips — a narrative disproved by medical authorities but still widely believed among certain Telegram users.
These examples show that Telegram-based misinformation is not confined to fringe groups. It can shape national dialogue, affect democratic institutions, and endanger public safety in ways that traditional social media no longer permit at the same scale.
Combating disinformation on Telegram presents unique difficulties. Unlike traditional platforms, Telegram lacks robust moderation tools or partnerships with independent fact-checkers. Still, several strategies can be implemented by governments, civil society, and even Telegram itself to slow the spread of false narratives.
Firstly, digital literacy campaigns must be expanded to include Telegram users. People need to be educated on recognising manipulation, verifying sources, and avoiding echo chambers. Secondly, civil society groups and media watchdogs can develop tools to track channel activity and identify coordinated disinformation efforts.
Telegram itself could be encouraged to implement optional verification for news channels or introduce clearer labelling systems to distinguish opinion from fact. While this risks clashing with its ethos of privacy, a balance must be found to prevent the abuse of the platform for malicious purposes.
Given the transnational nature of Telegram channels, cross-border collaboration is essential. European institutions and other democratic alliances should establish joint frameworks to monitor and respond to digital threats while respecting encryption rights and civil liberties.
In February 2025, the European Commission proposed new protocols for cross-border data access in criminal investigations involving encrypted platforms. If passed, this could provide a legal basis to hold disinformation actors accountable while preserving platform neutrality.
Ultimately, the fight against disinformation requires coordinated efforts, informed public discourse, and adaptive policy-making. Telegram is only one of many tools used in this information war, but its growing relevance demands urgent and nuanced attention.